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Bassford Remele is a full service litigation firm located in Minneapolis, Minnesota. Founded in 1882, the firm represents local, national and international clients in all areas of civil litigation and dispute resolution.
Case Law Update
Date: April 30, 2010 — Minneapolis, MN
During the week of April 30, 2010, the Minnesota appellate courts released an opinion on the following topic that may be of interest to our clients:
MINNESOTA HUMAN RIGHTS ACT – STANDING
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Under the Minnesota Human Rights Act, only parties to a business contract can sue for business discrimination; non-parties to the contract do not have a claim.
This is a claim under the Minnesota Human Rights Act (“MHRA”) addressing whether an employee of a party to a contract has the right to bring an action for discrimination personally against the other party to the contract.
In this case, plaintiff owned a drywall business called Diamond Dust. In 2005, Diamond Dust entered into a subcontract with general contractor Zeman. Thereafter, Diamond Dust began performing the contract, with plaintiff personally working on the project. Plaintiff alleged sexual harassment by Zeman managers. As a result, Diamond Dust ceased performance of the contract. Plaintiff, individually, and Diamond Dust both sued Zeman for discrimination in the performance of a contract under the MHRA.
The district court dismissed plaintiff’s individual claim, concluding that she lacked standing under the MHRA because Diamond Dust, not plaintiff, had the contract with Zeman. A divided court of appeals affirmed, holding that the MHRA only applies when there is a contract between the parties.
The issue before the Minnesota Supreme Court was whether an employee of a party to a contract has standing to bring a cause of action under the MHRA. The Court held that the MHRA does not grant an employee of a party to a contract a right to bring suit individually for discrimination in performance of a contract.
Justice Anderson, for the dissent, framed the issue as whether the MHRA required a contract between the discriminator and the person suffering discrimination. Based on the plain language of the statute, the dissent concluded that the MHRA did not require a contractual relationship and did not address who may pursue a claim for unlawful conduct. The dissent noted that only human persons are discriminated against, not entities. Thus, the dissent would have allowed plaintiff’s individual claim.
Krueger v. Zeman Const. Co., A08-206 (Minn. 4/29/10).
Editorial Staff |
C. Lundberg, C. Morris, K. Putney, R.A. Williams, J.S. Andresen, M. Covin, S. Gustad, B. Sande, C. Hund, S. Sitek, T. Quick, D. Camarotto, K. Burke, J. Marquet, D. Turner, L. Pugh, M. Bradford, P. Semrow, and S. Pearson |
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